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Abstract Amendments to the Fair Lending Act have exempted an age
restriction on ownership from fair housing prohibitions. This
paper studies the economic impact of such ownership restriction
on housing values. Using American Housing Survey data, we
ﬁnd that there is a signiﬁcant premium attached to the restrictive
covenant when other factors are controlled. In particular, we ﬁnd
that imposing age restriction on ownership increases the housing
values by anywhere from 10.5% to 12.7%. At the average house
value, this is equivalent to a dollar amount between $14,642 and
$17,399. The estimates are robust to different speciﬁcations in
hedonic equations.
The aging population has been recognized as one of the most profound
demographic changes in the United States. For instance, Census 2000 found that,
for the ﬁrst time, more than half of the U.S. population (50.5%) was age 35 or
older. The shift is owed to the fact that, in the 1990s, the nation’s largest
population cohorts—representing baby boomers born between 1945 and 1965—
transitioned into the 35-and-over age category. Over the ten-year period, the 50–
54 age group (who were 55–59 in 2005) experienced the largest percentage growth
in population—55%, or 6.2 million people. This trend will continue for the same
reason, as well as the persistent low fertility rate and growing longevity. The aging
of America has important implications for the housing and mortgage industries
for a number of reasons. First, older homeowners are an important source of
supply of existing homes for sale, and the kinds of homes they choose for
subsequent purchases represent a substantial part of housing demand (for example,
homes with ﬁrst-ﬂoor bedrooms, one-story homes, or condominiums located near
city centers or hospitals). Second, senior households with very low incomes are
more likely than other family types with comparable incomes to have worst case
needs.1 Households with seniors make up 22% of 5.18 million households with
worst case housing needs in 2003 (HUD, 2003).
To address housing needs for aged Americans, the Fair Housing Act has exempted
from its familial status provisions properties that satisfy the Act’s 55-and-older202  Lin, Liu, and Yao
housing condition under the 1988 amendment and subsequent changes made under
the Housing for Older Persons Act, a 1995 amendment. The Act essentially made
it legal to impose age restrictive covenants on a property and permissibly
discriminate against non-aged households. Most of these properties are located in
traditional retirement magnets. Census 2000 found that suburbs with the fastest
growth in persons aged 55 and over (hereafter, 55) are located predominantly
in ‘‘New Sunbelt’’ metros, while suburbs with the largest proportions of these
individuals are located in Rustbelt metros. Seniors in the latter type of suburbs
are, in general, older, more likely to be female, and more likely to live alone (Frey,
2003).
The age restriction on ownership is an important aspect in the bundle of property
ownership rights, and such a restriction can potentially affect the values of the
restricted properties. The effect, which remains an open empirical question, is of
interest to local land-use planners, economic developers, and real estate entities
in their efforts to address the housing demand of aging Americans. To estimate
the economic impact of the age restriction, one can apply the hedonic approach
to the housing market and infer the implicit price for this non-market amenity.
The implicit price here is measured by the coefﬁcient of an age-restriction variable
in the house price equation, controlled for other hedonic factors. In a competitive
market, this coefﬁcient or implied elasticity is also an estimate of marginal
willingness to pay (MWTP) for the age restriction amenity.
Two competing arguments can be associated with the economic impact of age
restriction. One is that age restriction works like a government regulation
(regulation theory) and creates excess supply of house stocks for 55 households.
Thus the supply curve shifts to the right and a new equilibrium will be reached
at a lower price. The price (negative) is a discount that compensates for economic
loss due to demand being unable to keep up with supply. The other argument is
that age restriction implies a great reduction of consumption uncertainty. In
particular, age restrictive covenants form a community occupied by same type of
consumers sharing similar preferences, which can increase the collective utility
level. As a result, living in an age-restricted property is considered not only a
right, but also a privilege. Thus, the price (positive) is the premium paid for
desirable extra house services. Do and Grudnitski (1997) is among the ﬁrst to
directly study the effect of age restriction on the prices of single-family residences;
they estimate a negative value (–6%) for age restriction, which supports the ﬁrst
argument. In studying the Broward County, Florida condominium market, Allen
(1997) ﬁnds a positive price effect (14%) from age restriction. A similar premium
was found in the age-restricted manufactured home in Mesa, Arizona by
Guntermann and Moon (2002). More recently, Guntermann and Thomas (2004)
study the single-family market in Youngtown, Arizona, the ﬁrst master-planned
retirement community in the U.S., which dates to 1954. They ﬁnd the evidence
of a large premium (18%) in Youngtown house prices, which could be attributed
to the town’s age-restricted status.Ownership Restriction and Housing Values  203
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Like Do and Grudnitski (1997) and Guntermann and Thomas (2004), this paper
examines the economic impact of age restriction on ownership in the single-family
market while controlling for a wide range of factors that might have come into
the valuation process. The contributions of this paper are twofold. First, we
develop a theoretical model and provide a closed-form formula to uncover the
relationship between age-restriction on ownership and housing values. Our model
projects a positive impact of age restriction on housing values and we attribute
the gain to reduced consumption uncertainty with explicit restriction on covenants.
This is consistent with the ﬁndings by Hughes and Turnbull (1996a, b). In
addition, besides housing attributes, location, and other variables commonly seen
in the hedonic literature, the model also suggests that the consumers’ different
housing consumption patterns along life-cycles, together with their income, also
play an important role in the determination of property values. Second, we apply
our model to American Housing Survey data. We ﬁnd that imposing age restriction
increases the property value by anywhere from 10.5% to 12.7% while controlling
for a wide range of other factors, such as income, life-cycle consumption patterns,
and house characteristics. In other words, there is a signiﬁcant premium attached
to age restriction with everything else being equal. However, we also ﬁnd that age
restriction can negatively affect the property value if it is already located in a 55
community, where the consumption uncertainty has been greatly minimized.
This paper proceeds as follows. We brieﬂy discuss the history of federal
regulations regarding age restriction in the next section. We then provide an
underlying theory, which serves as the theoretical framework for this study. After
the theory, we discuss the hedonic price models and American Housing Survey
data issues followed by our empirical results. The last section provides concluding
remarks.
 Background on Age Restrictions on Ownership Right
Before 1988, age restriction was not explicitly exempt from fair housing violations
and was largely considered as an act of discrimination. In the case of Casa Mane,
Inc. v. Superior Court of Puerto Rico, 752 F. Supp. 1132 (D. Puerto Rico 1990),
the neighbors sought and obtained a state court judgment ordering the owners to
close the home for disabled tenants who are seniors on the grounds that operation
of the home violated a restrictive covenant forbidding this particular use. The
plaintiffs demonstrated that the original action was brought because the neighbors
believed the presence of this type of residence might lower property values, since
such residence would cause people to think about death and would hinder the
spontaneity of the neighborhood children. The court found that plaintiffs produced
sufﬁcient evidence to show the defendant’s intent to discriminate against residents
who are senior citizens.
In the 1988 Amendment to the Fair Housing Act (Sec. 807. [42 U.S.C. 3607]),
housing for older persons is exempt from the prohibition against familial status
discrimination if:204  Lin, Liu, and Yao
 The HUD Secretary has determined that it is speciﬁcally designed for
and occupied by seniors under a federal, state or local government
program or
 It is occupied solely by persons who are age 62 or older or
 It houses at least one person who is age 55 or older in at least 80% of
the occupied units, and adheres to a policy that demonstrates an intent
to house persons who are 55 or older.
A transition period permits residents on or before September 13, 1988, to continue
living in the housing, regardless of their age, without interfering with the
exemption.
Under the Housing for Older Persons Act (HOPA), a 1995 amendment, certain
housing that is intended for and occupied by people who are at least age 55 can
legally discriminate against families with children but still may not discriminate
on the basis of race, color, national origin, religion, sex or disability. HOPA further
eliminates the requirement that 55 housing have ‘‘signiﬁcant facilities and
services’’ designed for seniors and establishes a ‘‘good faith reliance’’ immunity
from damages for persons who in good faith believe that the 55-and-older age
exemption applies to a particular property.
An age-restricted property must meet the Act’s requirements that at least 80% of
its occupied units have at least one occupant who is over age 55, and that it
publish and follow policies and procedures that demonstrate an intent to be 55
housing. An exempt property will not violate the Fair Housing Act if it includes
families with children, but it does not have to do so. A HUD rule published in
the April 2, 1999, Federal Register implements the Housing for Older Persons
Act of 1995, and explains in detail those provisions of the Fair Housing Act that
pertain to housing for seniors.
 The Underlying Theory
To study the economic impact of age restriction on housing values, this section
develops a theoretical model by incorporating age restriction as reduction of
consumption uncertainty, as in Hughes and Turnbull (1996b).
Suppose that a representative resident consumes two types of goods: housing and
non-housing. The expected utility function of consumer i is denoted by E[ui(h, y)],
where h is risky housing consumption and y is non-housing consumption. A risk-
averse consumer is assumed to have the following utility function:
i u(h, y)   log(h)   log(y). (1) iiOwnership Restriction and Housing Values  205
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Suppose that housing services consumed by the resident, denoted by housing
attributes x, are uncertain and follow a stochastic process with the following
functional form:
 2e 2 h  x , where   N(0,  ). (2) 
Equation (2) is consistent with the fact that a higher uncertainty  implies a lower
housing service. Given that E[e]  when   N(0, we have:
2 1/2 2  e  ), 
2 1/2 E[log(h)]  (2  e ) log(x). (3)
Inserting Equation (3) into Equation (1) yields2:
2 i 1/2 E[u(h, y)]  (2  e ) log(x)   log(y). (4) ii
Equation (4) suggests that a higher degree of uncertainty on housing attributes
() implies a lower utility level of the resident. Put it differently, the resident is
risk-averse to the consumption risk of the housing services, which is similar to
Hughes and Turnbull (1996b). When  0, the uncertainty of housing services 2 
disappears and h  x2.3
Suppose that the resident’s money budget is mi. The price of non-housing
consumption can be normalized to one while the price of housing is p per unit of
x. Hence, the house price is px. In a competitive market, the resident i selects x
and y to maximize his/her expected utility (4) subject to the budget constraint:
m  px  y. (5) i
Solving Equation (5) for y and substituting it into the expected utility function (4)
yields:
2 i 1/2 E[u(h, y)]  (2  e ) log(x)   log(m  px). (6) ii i
Each resident selects the optimal housing consumption x* to maximize the
expected utility in Equation (6). The ﬁrst-order condition results in the following206  Lin, Liu, and Yao
closed-form formula between the house price (px) and the uncertainty of housing
consumption ():
1
px*  m 1  , (7) 2  i 1/2 1  (2  e ) i
where i  i/i measures the consumption pattern of housing versus non-housing
goods, which may vary by age, race, and other demographic variables. When
i  1, the consumer values the housing consumption more than the non-housing
goods. A higher i implies that the consumer more strongly favors housing
consumption.
Equation (7) suggests that, besides housing attributes, three other factors play a
crucial role in determining the equilibrium hedonic price function: the uncertainty
of housing consumption (), income (mi), and the consumption pattern (i)o f




Equation (8) implies that, holding other things equal, the value of a property is
higher with less uncertainty on the housing consumption.








Equations (9) and (10) suggest that both the consumer’s income and consumption
pattern of housing versus non-housing goods have a positive effect on property
values.
When applied to the study of age restrictions on property values, the theory above
leads us to the following conclusions. First, since age restriction credibly limitsOwnership Restriction and Housing Values  207
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the uncertainty of some housing services, or , it in turn leads age-restricted
properties to have higher values than others. This is consistent with Hughes and
Turnbull’s (1996b) ﬁnding. Second, to quantify empirically how age restriction
alone affects property value, we need not only to control for hedonic factors (such
as housing characteristics, location, neighborhood effect, etc.), but also for
consumer income and consumption patterns from the demand side.
 The Empirical Model
The legally restricted senior housing may have ‘‘signiﬁcant facilities and services’’
designed for the seniors in place, and it will also restrict the future sales of the
unit. An explicit market for these extra amenities and restrictions does not exist.
But their economic value can be captured by the common hedonic price
speciﬁcation. In general, the price or value of the house unit can be written as:
n P
P(q , q ,...,q )  q , (11)  12 ni q i1 i
where the partial derivative of P with respect to the ith characteristic is referred
to as its marginal implicit value with everything else being equal. Equation (11)
can be regarded as a general form of hedonic price function.
In the choice of the correct functional form of a hedonic regression, there is no
strong theoretical basis (Halverson and Pollakowski, 1981). Follain and Malpezzi
(1980) tested a linear functional form and a log-linear speciﬁcation and found that
the log-linear form has a number of advantages over the linear form. Two
advantages are worth noting. First, the log-linear form allows for variation in the
dollar value of a particular characteristic so that the price of one component
depends in part on the house’s other characteristics. For example, with the linear
model, the value added by a third bathroom to a one-bedroom house is equal to
the value it adds to a ﬁve-bedroom house. This is unlikely. The log-linear form
allows the value added to vary proportionally with the size of the house. Second,
the coefﬁcients of the log-linear model have a simple and appealing economic
meaning. The coefﬁcients can be interpreted as approximately the percentage
change in the value given a unit change in the independent variable.
In this study, we thus choose the following log-linear speciﬁcation:
2 ln(P)     S   L   Age   Age   C 01 2 3 4 5
  M    AgeRes  , (12) 67 8208  Lin, Liu, and Yao
where P is value of the house; S denotes a set of structural characteristics; L is
the location within the market;4 Age and Age Squared are included to account for
the possible heteroscedasticity due to higher likelihood of renovations as dwellings
age (Goodman and Thibodeau, 1997), or the nonlinear effect of age on price; and
C controls for neighborhood effects. For instance, there is a price premium
associated with quiet streets or proximity to shopping centers. M and  measure
consumer income and consumption patterns, respectively; AgeRes is the dummy
variable indicating whether the property is age-restricted.
The variable AgeRes in Equation (12) is meant to measure the effect of age
restriction on housing value. Suppose 8 is the estimated coefﬁcient for the
properties with age restriction. Kennedy (1984) suggests that the percentage
change of housing value due to age restriction on ownership can be calculated as:
P  P 1 10 g  * 100  exp   var( )  1 * 100, (13)   88 P 2 0
where P1 and P0 are the housing values when the dummy variable of AgeRes is
equal to one and zero, respectively. Therefore, the economic impact of age
restriction on housing value can be easily quantiﬁed if we can estimate 8 and its
standard deviation.
 Data
In this section, we discuss the data used in the study. Three issues are examined:
data source, data quality, and the summary statistics of the data.
Data Source
We use American Housing Survey (AHS) Metropolitan Data to study the impact
of age restrictions on house price. AHS is the largest, regular national housing
sample survey in the U.S. and it has several advantages over sales data for use in
the creation of price indices: It is readily available, has frequent observations over
time and space, includes data from the late 1970s through the mid 1990s, includes
houses that do not sell as well as those that do, and has information about the
occupants (HUD, 2005). National surveys are collected in odd years and
metropolitan samples are collected in even years. Beginning in 2001, AHS asks
supplemental questions on aged Americans, i.e., if the structure is in an age-
restricted development or if the majority of neighbors are 55 years old. So far,
age restriction information is available for 26 metropolitan statistical areas (MSA).
We choose Phoenix, AZ as our sample MSA for several reasons. First, Phoenix
has the highest homeownership rate (60.7%) among the 23 living cities and ranks
among the top 10 cities nationwide (Brookings, 2003). Second, senior citizensOwnership Restriction and Housing Values  209
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represent a majority of homeowners in some communities on the fringe of the
Phoenix metro area. Phoenix, along with other Sunbelt regions, is one of the most
popular destinations for retirees and seniors. Third, from AHS data, Phoenix has
the highest share of age-restricted properties among all 26 MSAs. Among 2,083
single-family units interviewed in 2002, 7.4% are age-restricted and another 3.7%
are stated as unrestricted 55 majority communities. Communities for seniors and
retirees are well-established in Phoenix.
We limit our sample to single-family detached units with all variables being re-
deﬁned from original AHS. The selected variables cover the following segments
of AHS and their detailed deﬁnitions are described in Exhibit 1:
 Property Characteristics
 Neighborhood Characteristics and Location
 Demographic and Economic Variables
Data Quality
The dependent variable used for Models 1–5 is the logged current market value
of unit reported by the owner. Over the years, a few authors have addressed
concerns over the accuracy of such self-reported appraisal. For instance, Follain
and Malpezzi (1981) ﬁnd that the average owner-occupant is downward biased by
about 2% while renters are likely to overestimate by about 6% (Malpezzi, 2002).
More recently, Kiel and Zabel (2004) use the AHS metropolitan data to examine
whether the AHS can be used to create home price indices. Indices are estimated
using hedonic, repeat valuation, and hybrid techniques, overcoming some of the
problems inherent in the estimation of indices. They ﬁnd that the data suppression
issues and the owner stated house values are not problematic.
Data Description
Given AHS sample data, the dwelling universe is divided into two community
types: age-restricted and unrestricted communities. The mean and standard
deviation values of data are computed by three cohorts in Exhibit 2: unrestricted
properties with homeowner aged below 55 years old; unrestricted properties with
homeowner aged 55; and properties restricted to the age 55 population.
Overall, the housing preferences of the 55 groups are different from those of
younger groups. They usually live in older houses. They demand a smaller number
of bedrooms and bathrooms, and are less likely to have ﬁreplaces. The lot size
and living area of age-restricted properties are also smaller. At a neighborhood
level, 55 homeowners care more about community recreational facilities and
less about the quality of public transportation services. As expected, younger
people have higher incomes than older ones. Within the 55 age group, age-
restricted communities are usually newer than the unrestricted ones. Aside from210  Lin, Liu, and Yao
Exhibit 1  Variable Deﬁnitions
Variable Deﬁnition
Panel A: Property Characteristics
hage Age of the unit
hage2 Squared age
bedrms # of bedrooms
lsf Unit square footage (Logged)
llot Lot size (Logged)
ﬁreplace 1 if unit has ﬁreplace, 0 otherwise.
baths # of full baths
halfb # of half baths
ﬂoors # of ﬂoors
Panel B: Neighborhood Characteristic and Location Variables
commrec 1 if community recreational facilities are available, 0 otherwise.
newtrn 1 if the community public transportation is satisfactory, 0 otherwise.
zone Deﬁned area of  100,000 population
001:099 Zones inside the central city of an MSA
101:199 Zones in the suburbs of an MSA
201:299 Hybrid zones—contains cases in both the central city and
the suburbs of an MSA
Panel C: Personal Demographic and Economic Variables
linc Log (zinc). zinc is family income.
age ﬂg ‘‘Y’’ if householder ages 55; ‘‘N’’ otherwise.
agrees 1 if the property has age restriction, 0 otherwise.
Dependent Variable
logvalue Current market value of unit (logged)
these generalizations, the preferences of the aged population are mainly driven by
those who live in the restricted communities, not those in the unrestricted ones.
Their income is also lower than their peers.
Turning to standard deviations, age-restricted properties, and their residents, in
general, demonstrate smaller variations than unrestricted properties and their
residents. Unrestricted communities with older residents have greater variation
than communities with a younger population. The lower part of Exhibit 2 reports
standard deviation adjusted for mean, used in Hughes and Turnbull (1996b). We





























































Exhibit 2  Summary Statistics
Full Sample Age-Restricted Properties Unrestricted & Age 55 Unrestricted & Age 55
Variables Mean Std Dev. Mean Std Dev. Mean Std Dev. Mean Std Dev.
Panel A: Summary statistics
hage 19.84 16.54 18.97 13.51 23.12 16.19 18.66 16.81
hage2 666.86 985.56 541.18 579.82 796.31 991.46 630.47 1,014.20
bedrms 3.22 0.83 2.25 0.49 3.12 0.78 3.36 0.80
sf 2,128 1,478 1,663 696 2,297 1,815 2,115 1,383
lot 14,683 34,055 8,535 6,744 20,924 51,373 12,933 26,310
ﬁreplace 0.40 0.49 0.16 0.36 0.49 0.50 0.39 0.49
baths 2.02 0.57 1.91 0.35 1.99 0.61 2.04 0.57
halfb 0.24 0.44 0.10 0.31 0.27 0.48 0.24 0.44
ﬂoors 1.19 0.42 1.01 0.11 1.14 0.38 1.24 0.45
zinc 89,060 117,904 62,528 124,735 84,868 140,561 93,631 106,577
commrecrn 0.33 0.47 0.95 0.21 0.28 0.45 0.27 0.45
newtrnn 0.57 0.50 0.19 0.39 0.59 0.49 0.60 0.49


















Exhibit 2  (continued)
Summary Statistics
Panel B: Variation by Age Restriction
AgeRes
Variables 0 1 Ratio
hage 0.781 0.712 91%
bedrms 0.241 0.187 78%
sf 0.061 0.036 59%
lot 0.088 0.054 61%
Notes: For the full sample, N  2,085; for Age-Restricted Properties, N  154; for Unrestricted & Age 55, N  540; for Unrestricted & Age 55, N 
1,389. Variation  standard deviation/mean.Ownership Restriction and Housing Values  213
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age-restricted communities than those not. These differences have conﬁrmed that
age-restricted communities have signiﬁcantly less consumption uncertainty. People
living there would have more homogeneous preferences. Without controlling for
any property and household characteristics, the cohort of unrestricted properties
with age 55 owners is the most expensive, followed by those for younger
households, and last, age-restricted properties.
 Empirical Results
In order to estimate the value of age restriction on properties while controlling
for other factors, we estimate ﬁve hedonic equations.
1. Model 1: A typical hedonic model without controlling for age restriction;
2. Model 2: Add age restriction into Model 1;
3. Model 3: Add income to Model 2 from the underlying theory;
4. Model 4: Add age ﬂag to Model 2 based only on unrestricted properties;
and
5. Model 5: Allow age restriction to interact with age ﬂag.
Model 1 is the base model, while the other four augmented models are used to
test the effect of age restriction in the property valuation model. In the latter,
controlling for different variables is key to separating pure restriction from the
differences in income and housing consumption patterns over life-cycle and
between different household types. Results of Models 1 through 3 are reported in
Exhibit 3 and those of Models 4 and 5 are reported in Exhibit 4. These models
have explained 53% to 56% of variation in the property values. Coefﬁcients of
the variables included in each model, including structural, locational and
neighborhood characteristics, appear to be very robust: Their signs are consistent,
their magnitudes are very close, and omitting one of them would not affect price
estimates of other house characteristics.
House Characteristics
Standard house characteristic (e.g., number of bedrooms, living area, lot size, and
numbers of baths) are included in all ﬁve models. For all models we observe the
anticipated positive relationships5 with statistically signiﬁcant coefﬁcients. Each
full bath is 76% more valuable than a half bath and 44% more valuable than a
ﬁreplace. Holding other characteristics unchanged, a one-unit increase in living
area can be capitalized into a value 4.7 times higher than that resulting from a
similar increase in lot size. Among these ﬁve basic features, living area is the
most important factor in determining the house’s value.6
From Exhibit 2, age-restricted units are usually smaller with fewer bedrooms,
ﬁreplaces, and bathrooms. These factors imply a lower house value for age-
restricted units.214  Lin, Liu, and Yao
Exhibit 3  Estimates on Age Restriction and Income
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat.
Intercept 8.11*** 42.38 8.21*** 42.04 7.69*** 36.43
hage 0.012*** 6.94 0.013*** 7.25 0.012*** 6.99
hage2 0.0001*** 4.16 0.0001*** 4.44 0.0001*** 4.31
bedrms 0.03** 2.49 0.04*** 3.05 0.04** 2.43
lsf 0.36*** 13.03 0.36*** 12.88 0.36*** 12.93
llot 0.07*** 5.99 0.07*** 6.01 0.07*** 5.73
ﬁreplace 0.16*** 7.57 0.16*** 7.77 0.16*** 7.57
baths 0.22*** 9.92 0.21*** 9.76 0.20*** 9.11
halfb 0.13*** 5.75 0.13*** 5.83 0.13*** 5.62
linc 0.05*** 5.68
zone 001 0.13*** 3.33 0.13*** 3.45 0.15*** 3.83
002 0.07 1.07 0.08 1.19 0.07 1.05
003 0.21*** 3.08 0.22*** 3.2 0.21*** 3.18
004 0.18*** 2.85 0.17*** 2.76 0.15** 2.43
005 0.20** 2.38 0.20** 2.42 0.22*** 2.59
006 0.10** 2.13 0.10** 2.05 0.09* 1.87
007 0.13** 2.11 0.13** 2.19 0.11* 1.78
008 0.02 0.68 0.01 0.46 0.01 0.42
101 0.09*** 2.93 0.09*** 3.2 0.08*** 2.88
102 0.17*** 6.39 0.18*** 6.59 0.18*** 6.48
103 0 0 0
commrec 0 0.09*** 4.21 0.07*** 3.18 0.07*** 3.15
10 0 0
newtrn 0 0.02 0.96 0.03 1.31 0.02 1.21
10 0 0
ageres 1 0.11** 2.49 0.12*** 2.84
00 0
R2 53.3% 53.5% 54.7%
Notes: The number of observations is 2,083.
*Statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
**Statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
***Statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level.Ownership Restriction and Housing Values  215
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Exhibit 4  Estimates on Age Restriction, Income and Preferences
Model 4 Model 5
Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat.
Intercept 7.61*** 35.59 7.71*** 36.51
hage 0.013*** 7.21 0.013*** 7.17
hage2 0.0001*** 4.58 0.0001*** 4.47
bedrms 0.04*** 2.94 0.04*** 2.66
lsf 0.36*** 12.47 0.36*** 12.72
llot 0.07*** 5.92 0.07*** 5.58
ﬁreplace 0.16*** 7.43 0.15*** 7.44
baths 0.19*** 8.56 0.20*** 9.1
halfb 0.12*** 5.31 0.12*** 5.59
linc 0.06*** 5.63 0.06*** 5.90
zone 001 0.14*** 3.48 0.15*** 3.82
002 0.05 0.85 0.07 1.05
003 0.20*** 2.94 0.21*** 3.12
004 0.16*** 2.63 0.15** 2.44
005 0.20** 2.4 0.22*** 2.63
006 0.10** 2.17 0.08* 1.81
007 0.09 1.51 0.11* 1.75
008 0.03 0.91 0.01 0.45
101 0.13*** 4.21 0.09*** 2.93
102 0.16*** 5.95 0.17*** 6.41
103 0 0
commrec 0 0.07*** 3.11 0.07*** 3.10
10 0
newtrn 0 0.03 1.65 0.03 1.24
10 0
ageres 1*(age ﬂg ’y’) 0.10** 2.15
0*(age ﬂg ’n’) 0.04** 1.99 0.04*** 3.15
0*(age ﬂg ’y’) 0 0
R2 56.2% 54.8%
Notes: The number of observations for Model 4 is 1,929; the number of observations for Model 5
is 2,083.
*Statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
**Statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
***Statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level.216  Lin, Liu, and Yao
Nonlinearity Effect
As expected, a house depreciates as it ages. Our estimated annual depreciation
rate is about 1.2%–1.3%, lower than the 2.4% average over the 10-year period in
Goodman and Thibodeau (1997). This difference is mainly due to the different
housing market cycles represented by the two studies. Looking back from 2004,
we should certainly expect less depreciation with a pervasive housing boom
between 2001 and 2004, compared to the slow market around 1992. The age-
squared term has a positive effect on unit price, reﬂecting nonlinearity effects.
Location
A zone is deﬁned as a socioeconomically homogeneous area with a population
over 100,000. In almost all cases, each identiﬁed zone is equivalent to a group of
Census tracts. The zone variable in the AHS allows a character value from 001–
099 for locations inside the central city of an MSA and 100–199 for those in the
suburbs of the city. Because zone does not indicate the distance from center of
the city, their coefﬁcients do not reveal a consistent geographic pattern except that,
on average, properties located in the central city have a higher value than those
located in outlying areas.
Neighborhood Effect
There are recreational facilities in 95% of age-restricted communities in our
sample. But only 18% of them found the local public transportation satisfactory,
much lower than 60% elsewhere. To exclude the neighborhood effects in
estimating the price of age restriction, we include the above two neighborhood
characteristics in all the models. Both bear positive hedonic values, with the
community recreational feature (around 7%) more expensive than access to quality
bus services (around 2.5%).
Income Effect
Income, or ability to make mortgage payments, determines how much house a
person can afford. But lifestyle decision is also a factor; one household may
consider it important to live in a community among residents with similar interests,
while another may not. Models 3–5 estimate that people with higher incomes live
in more expensive houses: a 1% increase in family income implies an increase of
5%–6% in house values. Adding income appears to have helped control the low
income group who live in the age-restricted properties, and results in a higher
economic value of age restriction. Note that, from Model 2 to Model 3, the
coefﬁcient of the age restriction variable becomes statistically more signiﬁcant
and changes from 0.11 to 0.12, implying a slightly higher economic value of age
restriction after controlling income.Ownership Restriction and Housing Values  217
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Age Restriction
There is no obvious reversal in the coefﬁcient estimates of other variables when
the age restriction variable is included in Models 1–3. There is a signiﬁcant
positive value on age-restricted properties, controlling for other attributes: 11.6%
(coefﬁcient  0.11)7 when controlling for neighborhood effects, location, and
other house characteristics, and 12.7% (coefﬁcient  0.12) when including
income. This value capitalizes senior residents’ preference of the smaller
consumption uncertainty in these neighborhoods, with everything else being equal.
Measured in dollar values based on an average property, the age restriction in
covenants is equivalent to a premium ranging anywhere from $16,027 to $17,399.
What happens if an age restriction is placed on properties located in an already
55 community? Such a community is expected to have all the amenities favored
by older households, such as recreational activities and satisfactory public
transportation. Restrictive covenants would limit the potential demand at resale
with similar housing characteristics. We measure this by identifying a zone that
is populated with about 30% of 55 properties and then re-estimating Model 3
based on the subsample restricted to age-restricted or 55 properties in that zone.
Consumption uncertainty among these properties is much smaller compared to
other zones, and the coefﬁcient on age restriction is now negative (0.275 and t-
value is 1.37), indicating a discount. This result suggests that, when consumption
uncertainty for aged households has been identiﬁably reduced and additional
amenities are in place, the economic value of age restriction on covenant may
reverse. When there is no supply shortage, age restriction works like a government
regulation by creating excess supply or under-demand. Its effect on price will
become negative.
The Effect of Consumption Patterns over Life-Cycle
Does the premium on age restriction merely reﬂect an age difference or difference
in different life-cycle consumption patterns? Modigliani and Brumberg’s (1954)
Life-Cycle Hypothesis states that each individual progresses through various life-
cycle phases during which their assets and investment needs, including investment
on housing, differ. The theory has been conﬁrmed by many recent studies.8
In order to distinguish between life-cycle consumption patterns and age restriction,
Model 4 controls for age differences based on unrestricted properties only, and
Model 5 controls for age differences along with age restriction based on the full
sample (see Exhibit 4). As anticipated, younger households live in less expensive
homes (4.1% lower), holding other things equal. This may be due to more
contingent credit constraints and lower asset accumulation level for young
households. Controlling the age ﬂag with age restriction allows us to compare
unrestricted and restricted 55 properties. In Model 5, with life-cycle
consumption patterns and other hedonic factors controlled, there is still a
signiﬁcant 10.5% premium (coefﬁcient  0.1) on age-restricted properties over218  Lin, Liu, and Yao
unrestricted 55 properties. This is equivalent to a $14,642 premium based on
the average property value. The properties where young households live, compared
to unrestricted properties for older households, are 4.1% cheaper from the earlier
discussion. These two add up to about a 15% premium on age-restricted properties
over places where young households live.
 Conclusion
This paper attempts to quantify the value associated with an age restrictive real
estate covenant. Few papers have previously tackled the age restriction issue in
private covenant. Do and Grudnitski (1997) estimated a negative effect on property
value. Their results are conﬂicting with studies on consumption uncertainty. The
results in this paper are estimated from a theoretical framework derived from the
utility maximization problem and a more replicable data source, the American
Housing Survey. The factors controlled here could distort the estimate of the
hedonic value of age restriction in a private covenant.
We ﬁnd that there is a signiﬁcant premium attached to the restrictive covenant
when other hedonic factors are controlled. When controlling for a wide range of
variables such as house characteristics, location, income, neighborhood effects,
and life-cycle housing consumption patterns, imposing an age restriction increases
the property value by anywhere from 10.5% to 12.7%. At the average house value,
this is equivalent to a premium of between $14,642 and $17,399. This amount
quantiﬁes senior homeowners’ marginal willingness to pay to live in an age-
restricted community, or the beneﬁts of amenities speciﬁcally desirable to seniors
after subtracting the possible limited future resale value. The estimates are robust
to different identiﬁcations in hedonic equations.
It is worth noting that the estimated economic beneﬁt of age restriction is valid
only if there is no sufﬁcient supply of additional amenities needed for older
households, or if there is consumption uncertainty in terms of these amenities.
Normally, an age restriction covenant increases the property value in a community
not dominated by the 55 population. But in a community already dominated by
the 55 population, where consumption uncertainty for aged households has been
identiﬁably reduced, the economic beneﬁt of age restriction vanishes. Additional
age restrictive covenants in 55 communities would result in excess supply of
senior houses and limit the future resale value.
The results above have important implications to both public policy-makers and
industry participants in order to address the housing needs of American seniors.
But the study also has some limitations due to the fact that the AHS data was
collected during the housing boom and from one market only. In 2008 and early
2009, housing markets across the country have turned to consecutive declines. As
of December 2008, Standard & Poor’s Case/Shiller home price index has dropped
25% from its peak in 2006:Q2 and we have seen no signs of immediate recovery.
Moreover, the recent stock market crash has wiped out majority of many seniorOwnership Restriction and Housing Values  219
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citizens’ retirement savings. It’s very likely that some communities where senior
citizens reside have suffered deeper depreciation than other comparable markets.
All of these factors require further research.
 Endnotes
1 Households with ‘‘worst case needs’’ are deﬁned as unassisted renters with very low
incomes (below 50% of area median income—AMI) who pay more than half of their
income for housing or live in severely substandard housing.
2 To simplify the analysis, we assume that the non-housing consumption is a non-stochastic
variable.
3 Since a higher X always indicates a higher utility level, in Equation (3) we assume that
(2  0, i.e.,  2 ln(2).
2 1/2 2  e ) 
4 S and L are used as standard speciﬁcation of hedonic price functions (Malpezzi, 2002).
5 Their signs are also consistent with most hedonic house price models.
6 One would expect that many of the properties with the age restriction are one-story
houses. Instead of attributing the difference to the regulation, the higher price of these
properties may due to (at least partly) the fact that they are more convenient for elder
population (one-story). Because of this concern, we initially included the variable of
‘‘ﬂoors’’ in our hedonic model. Given the evidence that this variable is statistically
insigniﬁcant (the t-statistics for one-story houses is 0.40), we dropped this variable in
our ﬁnal model.
7 11.6% is estimated using Equation (13).
8 For instance, McLeod and Ellis (1982) ﬁnd clear evidence of reduced space consumption
once child rearing is completed and for the presence of income constraints within
life-cycle stages. Yang (2005) discovered that borrowing constraints are essential in
explaining the accumulation of housing assets early in life, while transaction costs are
crucial in generating the slow downsizing of the housing assets later in life.
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